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I. WHY IS REFORM NEEDED? 
 
Metropolitan areas are poorly governed. This is a serious problem because they are home to 
more than 80 percent of the nation’s population and they produce more than 90 percent of its 
economic output. Increasing sprawl, congestion, racial and economic segregation, and disparities 
in the quality of local services are hurting metropolitan residents and undermining the fair and 
sustainable growth of the national economy.  
Metropolitan areas across the nation continue to sprawl, consuming land at rates that vastly 
exceed the rates their populations grow (Fulton et al. 2001). The urbanized land in the nation has 
increased nearly three times faster than the nation’s metropolitan population growth in the last 
decade alone (Ewing et al. 2007). Economic activity in metropolitan areas has also steadily 
decentralized as jobs continue to move away from urban cores to suburban employment centers 
(Kneebone 2009).  
Sprawling metropolitan areas experience significant mismatches between where residents live 
and work. As a result, residents in such metros travel longer distances on a daily basis (Ewing, 
Pendall and Chen 2003). Transportation accounts for nearly a third of the carbon emissions the 
United States generates. Despite planned improvements in vehicle efficiency and fuel carbon 
content, the nation cannot reduce its carbon emissions sufficiently without significantly 
decreasing the overall vehicle miles traveled by Americans (Ewing et al. 2007). 
 Racial and economic segregation in the nation’s schools have been steadily increasing 
since the 1980s (Orfield and Lee 2005). Over three-quarters of Latino and over 70 percent of 
African-American students who attend public schools attend racially segregated schools—most 
of which also have high concentrations of poor students (Rebell and Wolff 2006, p.5; Orfield and 
Lee 2005). 
Growing disparities in the quality of local services make it impossible for metropolitan 
residents to have access to equal opportunities. For instance, local communities with stronger tax 
bases in metropolitan areas can afford to lend more support to their neighborhood schools. In 
contrast, districts with poorer tax bases, which tend to have more students of color and low-
income students, cannot (Grant-Thomas 2009, p. 8). This creates significant funding disparities 
in school districts.
1
 In fact, these funding disparities were so severe that courts in 28 states have 
declared their school finance systems unconstitutional (The National Access Network 2009). The 
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 For example, in the 2005-2006 school year, high-poverty districts in the nation received $773 (8%) less in per 
pupil funding than low-poverty districts. Similarly, high-minority districts received on average $1,122 (11%) less 
than low-minority districts (The Education Trust 2009, p.13). 
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disparities, which are generally ameliorated by state aid to local school districts, are likely to 
expand given the severe recent cuts in state education funding across the nation caused by the 
current recession (Johnson, Oliff and Koulish 2009, p. 3).  
The highly fragmented nature of the political systems that govern America’s metropolitan 
areas contributes mightily to all of these problems. The harms of political fragmentation are 
many and tightly interrelated. The excessive competition triggered by political fragmentation 
encourages local jurisdictions to pursue socially and economically undesirable policies. Cities 
steal malls and office parks from each other, fight tax incentive wars for auto malls, and zone out 
the poor for fiscal advantage in a process rife with haphazard planning and NIMBY biases. This 
disjointed status quo scatters new jobs like grapeshot at the furthest edge of development and in 
so doing throws the metropolitan housing market even farther afield into farmland, forest, and 
sensitive natural places. With jobs scattered like buckshot, transit, a cleaner environment, and 
basic opportunity for lower income Americans becomes harder, not easier, to accomplish. 
Regional Harms of Political Fragmentation 
a. Fragmentation is inefficient.  
 
In the absence of regional governance, highly fragmented local government systems create 
incentives for local governments to compete for activities that generate high tax revenues and 
low service demands such as office parks, industrial development, and expensive single-family 
homes. This intra-regional competition for local development, however, is usually a zero-sum 
game. Regions as a whole experience little or no net real gains from intra-regional competition 
since local governments often merely attract development from other areas of the region and at 
times trigger cycles of decline in areas that lose desirable land uses. As a result, highly 
fragmented metropolitan economies tend to grow less than less fragmented metros (Nelson and 
Foster 1999; Miller 2002, p. 130; Hamilton, Miller and Paytas 2004; Orfield and Luce 
forthcoming in 2009). 
It has been long recognized that regional service systems are also the most efficient way to 
provide many services. Wastewater treatment facilities are a good example. Allowing local 
governments to make decisions regarding the sites of wastewater treatment facilities can create 
costly duplications because large centralized wastewater treatment facilities are cheaper and 
more efficient to operate than a number of dispersed, smaller facilities. Moreover, myopic local 
decisions can ignore the negative effects such decisions might have on adjacent localities—a 
negative externality that can only be avoided by making regional decisions regarding the sites of 
wastewater treatment facilities (Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009).  
Similarly, the provision of transportation services has network benefits that extend to the 
entirety of the region. Network benefits imply that individual transportation links or nodes 
provide further access to other links and nodes and increase the overall connectivity of the entire 
system (Giuliano 2007, p. 7). Some transportation links and nodes that are critical to enhancing 
the connectivity of the system might not be individually profitable from the viewpoint of local 
governments. As a result, allowing regional transportation decisions to be dictated by local 
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governments might prevent these network benefits from being realized, generating region-wide 
inefficiencies. 
b. Fragmentation encourages unsustainable growth. 
 
Political fragmentation is strongly associated with metropolitan sprawl and patterns of 
unconstrained, unguided urban growth (Razin and Rosentraub  2000; Carruthers and Ulfarsson 
2002; Carruthers 2003; Byun and Esparza 2005; Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009). The 
unclustered employment growth that usually results from uncontrolled inter-local competition for 
business development makes transit untenable. Sprawling metros also experience significant 
mismatches between where residents live and work. As a result, residents in such metros travel 
longer distances on a daily basis (Ewing, Pendall and Chen 2003). The difference between low-
density sprawling metros and high-density ones is more than 10 vehicle miles traveled per capita 
per day—a difference of 40 percent (Ewing et al. 2007, p. 69).
2
  
Transportation accounts for nearly a third of the carbon emissions the United States 
generates. Research shows that despite planned improvements in vehicle efficiency and fuel 
carbon content, the nation cannot reduce its carbon emissions sufficiently without significantly 
decreasing the overall vehicle miles traveled by Americans (Ewing et al. 2007). The twin 
national goals of limiting oil dependency and reversing global warming by reducing carbon 
emissions cannot be attained in the absence of metropolitan governance institutions that can 
curtail the unsustainable, sprawling growth patterns encouraged by political fragmentation. 
 
c. Fragmentation deepens social, economic, and fiscal inequalities in metropolitan 
areas. 
 
The fragmentation of local governments fosters residential segregation in metropolitan areas 
and contributes to concentrations of poverty in urban and inner suburban areas populated by 
residents of color (Weiher 1991; Frank 2001; Miller 2002, p. 127). Fragmentation directly 
contributes to residential segregation by encouraging exclusionary zoning practices among 
municipalities. These practices discourage the construction of affordable housing in opportunity-
rich suburban areas, ultimately generating regional concentrations of affordable housing in low-
opportunity urban and inner suburban neighborhoods (Pendall 2000; Rothman-Shore and 
Hubbard 2009).  
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 This finding comes from a study which controls for metropolitan growth, per capita income, and other relevant 
factors. Similarly, research shows that “doubling residential density across a metropolitan area might lower 
household VMT by about 5 to 12 percent, and perhaps by as much as 25 percent, if coupled with higher employment 
concentrations, significant public transit improvements, mixed uses, and other supportive demand management 
measures.” (Transportation Research Board 2009, p. 2).  
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Local land use and zoning decisions strongly influence a municipality’s housing stock, and 
determine what types of people can reside within its boundaries. For instance, developing areas 
can effectively exclude low-income residents of all races by severely limiting the land zoned for 
multifamily development or by requiring very large (and therefore more expensive) homes and 
lots. In competing for additional tax base, municipalities aggressively zone for high-end 
commercial/industrial and residential developments because such high-end developments 
augment a locality’s tax base by more than the cost of local services they require. 
Most suburban municipalities resist affordable housing because it does not bring much in tax 
revenues while it generates high service costs at the local level. The costs of providing affordable 
housing are endured locally, while the benefits are largely regional in scope. Intra-regional 
competition for tax base encourages municipal governments to pursue exclusionary zoning 
practices, and political fragmentation only intensifies these competitive pressures. Only a 
regional governing authority, with a mission to realize the long-term regional benefits of 
affordable housing policy, can turn this short-sighted, harmful competition into healthy regional 
collaboration.  
Exclusionary zoning practices not only result in metro-wide shortages of affordable housing 
but they also accentuate regional mismatches between jobs and housing by creating uneven 
distributions of affordable housing within regions. The skewed distribution of affordable housing 
in metros has significant equity implications. The concentration of affordable housing in the 
region’s core results in concentrations of poverty in these areas. This limits the ability of area 
residents—primarily low-income persons and people of color—to access high quality jobs, 
schools, and neighborhoods in growing suburban areas. 
Fragmentation also intensifies fiscal inequalities among local governments. In most 
metropolitan areas, local governments exhibit a wide spectrum of fiscal capacities. Local 
governments with the highest public needs and service costs are usually the ones with the most 
limited fiscal capacities to pay for public services such as roads, public safety, and sewer 
services. Region-wide provision of such services can help spread the costs of services across the 
whole region, and help ease fiscal inequalities among local governments (Orfield and Luce 
forthcoming in 2009). 
Low tax-capacity governments cannot afford to match the public subsidies used by higher-
capacity areas to attract fiscally lucrative office parks, industrial and retail businesses. They also 
tend to have the greatest costs and needs, increasing the stress on their tax bases (Orfield 2002, 
pp. 31-46). In contrast, high-capacity local governments are able to offer high-quality public 
services at lower tax rates because of their large tax bases—a factor which makes them even 
more attractive to most businesses. Only regional land use policies can short-circuit the vicious 
cycles of decline that can result from such imbalances. 
 
d. Political fragmentation hurts all types of communities. 
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Suburban communities in metropolitan areas are no longer immune to the harms of highly 
fragmented political systems. The city/suburb distinction within metropolitan areas is not as 
distinct as it once was. Differences between cities and suburbs have been blurred for quite a 
while, with some older suburbs nowadays having more in common with central cities than the 
newer suburbs (Orfield 2002; Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2010). Suburban communities are 
now very diverse in the ways they develop (Orfield 2002). 
Suburban communities are diverse, but not infinitely so. Distinct groups are discernable, 
based on their fiscal capacities and service needs.  Orfield and Luce have used these 
characteristics to classify communities into several groups including central cities, stressed 
suburbs, developed job centers, developing job centers, bedroom developing suburbs, and 
affluent residential suburbs (Orfield and Luce 2010). Communities in each group tend to have 
similar interests since regional trends affect them in comparable ways and they are therefore 
natural partners in discussions of regional policy. 
While central cities certainly continue to bear the brunt of the harms of highly fragmented 
political systems, all types of suburban communities are hurt by these harms—albeit to varying 
degrees. Similar dynamics of racial and economic segregation, loss of tax base and inability to 
compete with new suburbs undermine the stability of central cities and older stressed suburbs 
alike. Many fast-growing suburbs—developing job centers and bedroom developing 
communities for the most part—with modest fiscal resources are gaining school age children 
faster than their tax bases are growing, making it very difficult to provide good public schools. 
They are also often developing faster than their ability to provide adequate roads and sewer 
systems. Finally, developed suburbs, whether rich or poor, suffer from congestion and face 
challenges in preserving open space as suburbs surrounding them continue to grow at a rapid 
pace. 
a. Limitations of Existing Metropolitan Governance Structures 
 
All types of MPOs essentially operate through two legal mechanisms. Metropolitan problems 
are addressed either through special purpose governments or through voluntary agreements 
among local governments.
3
 Special purpose governments and voluntary agreements at best 
provide ad hoc solutions to regional problems. They suffer from a number of limitations that 
limit their effectiveness as regional institutions.
4
  
Special purpose governments complicate the issue of regional coordination and planning by 
adding to the multiplicity of existing governments. They usually lack accountability especially 
when their boards are appointed or elected by special groups in the population, like property 
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 (Frug 2002, p. 1788). Special purpose governments, which include public authorities and special districts, “are 
independent public agencies established under state law to deal with a specific problem such as fire protection, water 
supply, waste disposal, or transportation; occasionally, they are responsible for a limited combination of problems. 
Voluntary agreements are contracts entered into by two or more local governments, and they provide an alternative 
mechanism to address the same kind of issues.” (Frug 2002, p. 1781) 
4
 For a more detailed examination of the limitations of special purpose governments and voluntary agreements upon 
which the following discussion is based, see (Frug 2002, pp. 1783-1786).  
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owners. They are inefficient in the sense that they perform a public function more expensively 
than a local government. Most importantly, the presence of special purpose governments 
continues to enable the highly fragmented political systems that undermine effective regional 
governance.  
Voluntary agreements between local governments suffer from similar limitations. Since these 
agreements typically focus on single issues, they tend to proliferate and complicate regional 
coordination and planning. They undermine democratic control over local government functions 
since local officials usually enter contracts that last longer than their elected terms. Finally, like 
special purpose governments, voluntary agreements tend to perpetuate the system of fragmented 
governance in the nation’s metros. 
Effective metropolitan reform requires the creation of regional institutions that are capable of 
producing comprehensive regional solutions. Neither special purpose governments nor voluntary 
agreements are suitable for effective regional governance. Despite this, they have been 
proliferating in number and are fast becoming the most common forms of dealing with regional 
problems (Miller 2002, p. 49; Frug 2002, p. 1781). Special purpose governments and voluntary 
agreements are popular because they have been viewed as incremental solutions to regional 
problems—a fact which has made them politically easy to adopt. 
Far from providing the comprehensive regional solutions needed to strengthen metropolitan 
areas, special purpose governments and voluntary agreements impede such solutions. They do so 
by leaving “permanently off the table the most divisive issues facing metropolitan America—
schools, crime, housing, jobs, and taxes” (Frug 2002, pp. 1787-1788). Effective regional 
governance would require multi-purpose governance structures that are legally empowered to 
tackle these thorny issues. 
 
b. Multi-purpose regional governance structures with strong powers produce better 
regional outcomes.
5
 
 
Few metropolitan areas in the nation have the strong general-purpose governance structures 
resemble the full-fledged regional systems needed to integrate land use, transportation, housing, 
and environmental policy on a metropolitan scale. The Twin Cities’ Metropolitan Council and 
Portland’s Metro come closest. They are well known for the extensive authority they have for 
planning metropolitan growth and reviewing policies related to regional growth patterns (Orfield 
and Luce forthcoming in 2009).
6
 These MPOs are regional governing bodies in the sense that 
they neither duplicate nor replace functions performed by local governments in their 
metropolitan areas, providing services that are most efficiently rendered at a regional scale. In 
both the Twin Cities and Portland, the presence of regional multi-purpose governments with 
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 This section heavily relies on the findings reported in (Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009). 
6
 Orfield and Luce note that “MPOs that have been given state-mandated powers, such as Seattle, San Diego, Los 
Angeles, and Denver, are arguably evolving into multi-purpose governments, though the Twin Cities and Portland 
regional governments remain more powerful.” (Orfield and Luce, forthcoming in 2009, footnote i). 
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strong land use, transportation, and growth management powers has helped curb sprawl and 
racial segregation and has promoted job growth and fiscal equity (Orfield and Luce forthcoming 
in 2009). 
Less Sprawl  
Fragmentation intensifies the dysfunctional intra-regional competition by local 
governments for additional tax base. Local governments try to maximize their tax bases by 
zoning most of their land for high-end, big residential lots, or commercial development, creating 
low-density settlement patterns and job sprawl. Fragmentation also enables leap-frog 
development by decreasing the area over which individual planning organizations hold power. 
As Figure 1 clearly shows, metropolitan areas with higher levels of political fragmentation tend 
to sprawl more.  
Figure 1 also demonstrates that from 1970 to 2000 both Portland and Twin Cities 
sprawled much less than would be expected, given their fragmentation rates. The sprawl ratios of 
Twin Cities and Portland were 15 percent and 30 percent lower than expected given each 
region’s existing level of political fragmentation (Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009). In fact, 
the Twin Cities had the lowest sprawl rate among the highly fragmented metros, while Portland 
had the second lowest rate among the metropolitan areas with low fragmentation rates. 
 
 
 
Less Segregation 
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The Twin Cities and Portland also experience much lower levels of racial segregation 
than one would expect given their levels of political fragmentation. Higher levels of political 
fragmentation in metropolitan areas are associated with greater racial segregation, measured by 
the dissimilarity index for white and black residents (Figure 2).
7
 Figure 2 demonstrates that the 
regional coordination of land use planning in Twin Cities and Portland clearly alleviates the 
degree of racial segregation resulting from the local exclusionary zoning practices encouraged by 
political fragmentation. In fact, the dissimilarity indices for Portland and Twin Cities were 
respectively 23 percent and 16 percent lower than expected given each region’s existing level of 
political fragmentation (Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009). Again, Portland performed 
second best among metros with low fragmentation rates while the Twin Cities had the lowest 
level of racial segregation among highly-fragmented metros. 
 
 
 
More Employment Growth 
 
Political fragmentation intensifies the dysfunctional intra-regional competition by local 
governments for additional tax base. Often such competition merely reshuffles jobs from low-
capacity municipalities, which cannot afford to extend the expensive government subsidies other 
municipalities extend to attract new businesses, to high-capacity municipalities. It rarely 
produces any significant new regional economic growth. As a result, in addition to being 
associated with more sprawl and segregation, political fragmentation is also associated with 
slower job growth in metropolitan areas (Figure 3).  
 
                                                 
7
 The dissimilarity index measures the percent of regional residents who would have to change residences in order to 
achieve complete integration. 
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Once again, the Twin Cities and Portland enjoy higher job growth rates than metropolitan 
areas with similar levels of political fragmentation. In the Twin Cities, employment grew at 
nearly double the rate expected given its level of political fragmentation—29 percent compared 
to 16 percent between 1990 and 2000. In Portland, jobs grew at a rate that was two thirds higher 
than the predicted rate given its level of fragmentation—39 percent versus 24 percent (Orfield 
and Luce forthcoming in 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Less Fiscal Inequality 
 
Intra-regional competition takes place on an uneven playing field where local 
governments with widely different fiscal capacities compete with each other. In most cases, 
high-capacity municipalities are the winners of intra-regional competition at the expense of low-
capacity municipalities. Fragmentation deepens fiscal inequities in metropolitan areas by 
intensifying this dysfunctional competition among local governments, creating a regional chasm 
among haves and have-nots. As Figure 4 demonstrates, in the largest 25 metropolitan areas there 
is a positive relation between political fragmentation and fiscal inequality (measured by the Gini 
coefficient for local tax base).
8
  
 
The Twin Cities and Portland again stand out among the largest 25 metropolitan metros 
with their low levels of fiscal inequality (Figure 4). The Gini coefficient of the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area is 35 percent below the level predicted by its level of political 
fragmentation—an actual Gini coefficient of 0.17 compared to a predicted one of 0.26. 
Similarly, fiscal inequality in Portland was 50 percent lower than the level predicted by 
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 The Gini coefficient measures the difference between the actual distribution of tax base and a perfectly equal 
distribution. It varies between 0 and 1, taking on a value of 0 if the distribution is perfectly equal (all jurisdictions 
have the same tax base per household) and 1 if the distribution if perfectly unequal (one jurisdiction with only one 
household has the entire tax base). 
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its level of fragmentation—an actual coefficient of 0.11 versus a predicted coefficient of 
0.22 (Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional policies such as regional tax base sharing programs or regional transportation and land 
use planning to distribute economic activity and affordable housing more equitably across 
regions can also reduce these fiscal inequities. The Twin Cities uses a regional tax-base sharing 
program, while Portland relies on its strong regional transportation and planning powers to 
reduce regional fiscal inequalities.
9
 As the examples of the Twin Cities and Portland show, the 
two regions with the most highly developed multi-purpose regional governance structures fare 
better than expected in a variety of economic and social measures.  
 
I. WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIALS OF EFFECTIVE METROPOLITAN 
GOVERNANCE? 
                                                 
9
 “In the Twin Cities, the Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971 instituted a tax base sharing program that reduces the 
disparities between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Each taxing jurisdiction must contribute 40 percent of the growth of 
its commercial and industrial tax capacity since 1971 to a regional pool, which is then shared amongst all local 
governments, with a larger proportion going to municipalities with lower-than-average market value per capita. It 
has had the effect of reducing inequality by approximately 20 percent. The program was created during the same 
wave of regionalism that led to the Met Council, although it is administered by the seven counties included in the 
program rather than the Met Council.” (Orfield and Luce forthcoming in 2009). 
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Regional institutions need to be democratic, accountable, powerful, and multi-purpose to provide 
effective regional governance.  
 
a. The need for democratic regional governance structures 
 
Effective regional governance requires democratic regional institutions. Undemocratic 
representation within regional institutions intensifies regional inequities, erodes institutional 
legitimacy, and undermines the effectiveness of these institutions. 
Current federal laws applying to MPOs do not require representational voting. As a result, 
voting structures of MPOs are rarely apportioned to population (Sanchez 2006). This has serious 
implications for regional equity. For instance, an analysis of the governing boards of MPOs 
shows that voting structures of MPOs severely underserve urban areas in favor of suburban 
jurisdictions (Sanchez 2006). Such imbalances in representation can have detrimental 
consequences for the development of regional transportation networks. For instance, one study 
shows that an MPO’s commitment to transit (as measured by the share of its resources 
committed to transit services) declined by 1 to 7 percent for each suburban vote added to an 
MPO board (Nelson et al. 2004). 
The general lack of representational voting within MPO governing boards also undermines 
effective regional governance because non-democratic governance structures tend to produce 
outcomes that go against the interests of underrepresented parties. This in turn undercuts the 
legitimacy of regional institutions and their policies in the eyes of local constituencies which are 
not fairly represented. Typically, underrepresentation does not go unchallenged. When 
inadequate representation is not institutionally addressed, such challenges can undermine the 
effective working of regional institutions (Sanchez and Wolf 2005). 
These representational imbalances especially hurt transit-dependent low-income residents 
and residents of color who disproportionately live in the urban core of metropolitan regions. In 
the case of the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG), for instance, 
constituents challenged the representativeness of the MPO voting structure, alleging that 
overrepresentation of suburban districts on the board resulted in disproportionately little 
investment in transit compared to highway investments in the Detroit metropolitan region 
(Sanchez and Wolf 2005). MPOs can only avoid such costly challenges by creating governance 
boards where all local jurisdictions and interests are fairly represented. 
Fair representation, however, does not necessarily mean that regional policies should be the 
result of a consensus-oriented process. While the overall goal of regional policies is to create a 
‘winning region,’ regional governance is rarely a conflict-free process. Regional policies create 
local losers and winners, and regional decision-making cannot cater to the interests of all local 
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jurisdictions at the same time. What fair representation guarantees, however, is a legitimate way 
of institutionalizing a negotiation process among all the local jurisdictions of a metropolitan area. 
This process offers a venue where regional goals are articulated in a democratic fashion by 
taking into consideration the regional interests of all jurisdictions in the region. 
The fact that many MPOs are currently composed of members whose primary responsibility 
is another elected body, such as a city or county council, creates another important problem. 
When the MPO is only a secondary “home” for a representative, this means that MPO 
representatives are not elected primarily on the basis of their actions or opinions on regional 
issues. Voters instead almost certainly evaluate them overwhelmingly on their performance in 
their primary job. For regional concerns to receive the attention merited by their importance, 
members of MPO boards should be directly elected, ensuring that representatives are evaluated 
solely on the basis of their performance on regional concerns. 
 
b. The need for accountable regional governance structures 
 
MPOs should be held accountable both to voters and to the federal and state governments 
that provide much of their funding. Democratic governance institutions would satisfy much of 
the first requirement—accountability to voters. However, since much of the funding for regional 
services like transportation, housing and environmental protection comes from state and federal 
sources, there is great potential to incentivize regional funding streams to create a strong 
outcome orientation among MPOs. MPOs should be required to produce concrete measures of 
the outcomes of their programs—measures that can be used by both funders and voters to 
evaluate their effectiveness. 
Measuring regional progress requires a clear articulation of regional goals. The harms of 
fragmentation manifest themselves in a number of policy arenas including land use, 
transportation, housing, and environment. Therefore, the effectiveness of regional governance 
structures can only be evaluated by measuring the extent to which interconnected regional goals 
are achieved. These metrics of accountability should include: the effectiveness and sustainability 
of land use policies; how evenly affordable housing is distributed; region-wide racial and 
economic integration; the extent to which job growth is clustered to promote multi-modal 
transportation options and transit-oriented development; congestion and vehicle miles traveled; 
and fiscal equality among local jurisdictions.  
 
c. The need for powerful regional governance structures 
 
The other side of accountability is empowerment. MPOs need to be organizationally capable 
of meeting the challenges facing their regions before they can legitimately be held accountable 
for meeting regional goals. Regional governance is a challenging, conflict-ridden process and 
MPOs need to have significant governing capacities to be able to handle these challenges.  
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In order to govern regions effectively, MPOs should be empowered to do comprehensive 
regional planning, not just transportation planning. Comprehensive regional planning involves 
coordination of regional transportation, land use, housing, and environmental policies.
10
 
Effective implementation of comprehensive regional plans requires the authority to ensure that 
local development plans are consistent with the regional comprehensive plans. The authority to 
review local plans and override local decisions regarding land use, transportation, housing, and 
the environment is crucial for MPOs in implementing their comprehensive regional plans. 
One way to empower MPOs with these authorities would be to directly require MPOs to 
do comprehensive regional planning in order to be certified. Another more indirect way to do 
this is for HUD to require or incentivize regional land use and housing plans to be in place in 
metropolitan areas and for the federal government to reinstitute A-95 powers specifically to 
MPOs. The federal government once gave the MPOs significant metropolitan powers through 
the A-95 review process, which authorized MPOs to review, from a regional standpoint, and, if 
necessary, override local decisions regarding land use, transportation, and housing (National 
Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 2008, pp. 47-50).
11
 
Whatever method is used to empower MPOs, regional governance structures should be 
appropriately scaled to cover entire metropolitan areas. As regions grow, the jurisdictional 
boundaries of MPOs should grow with them. Otherwise, the jurisdictions of MPOs will be 
geographically under-bounded, and this would certainly compromise their governing 
capacities.
12
 One way to avoid this would be for the federal government to require that MPOs 
have jurisdiction over an area that is at least coterminous with the most recent Census 
Designated Metropolitan Area definitions. 
Finally, the power of MPOs is ultimately bound by the power of the states that create them. 
The policy decisions of states have significant impact on metropolitan outcomes. MPOs cannot 
succeed in achieving the desired metropolitan outcomes without the help of supportive state 
policies. For instance, if state DOTs keep spending federal transportation funds 
disproportionately for rural areas, MPO policies to curb residential and job sprawl cannot be 
successful. Similarly, if states do not support regional planning by MPOs through regulation of 
land use beyond metropolitan area boundaries, MPOs will have a hard time managing 
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 As Briffault argues, the land use powers of MPOs “must include both the authority to adopt regional land use 
plans that will bind future land development throughout the region and the power to displace local land use actions 
that have regional significance. Such regionally significant uses include local barriers to regionally necessary, but 
locally undesirable land uses, and local land use authorizations that impose negative externalities on the rest of the 
region.” (Briffault 1996, p. 1166)  
11
 The powers given to MPOs through the A-95 review process were essential for distributing affordable housing 
and opportunity more equally in many metropolitan areas (Connerly and Smith 1996).  
12
 The Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities region is a good example of this problem. The legal jurisdiction of 
the Metropolitan Council covers seven counties. This was the entire Census Designated Metropolitan Area at the 
time the Council was established. Since then the region has grown to include 13 counties, including two in 
Wisconsin.  As a result, the Metropolitan Council has no jurisdiction over four Minnesota collar counties now 
included in the metropolitan area. This geographically under-bounds the Council’s jurisdiction, impeding its ability 
to manage the region’s growth.   
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metropolitan growth. While acknowledging the importance of state governments to metropolitan 
governance reform, this paper does not discuss state-level policy reforms that should accompany 
MPO reform in order to focus on reforms at the federal level.    
c. The need for multi-purpose regional governance structures 
 
Effective regional governance requires powerful multi-purpose governance structures 
because the most crucial regional problems are tightly interrelated. Frug summarizes the intricate 
connections between regional issues: 
 
Traffic problems result from the location of housing, jobs, and commercial life. The 
quality of the schools and the crime rate influence housing decisions: those who can 
afford to do so move to where the schools are good and the crime rate low. Tax policy 
and zoning rules help determine where that is. Tax revenues are based on property 
values: the differences in the levels of funding available for schools and crime control 
reflect differences in the quality of housing, jobs, and commercial life. Zoning rules allow 
some localities to attract the “better” types of residents and businesses and exclude the 
rest. But neither businesses nor city residents can settle in these favored locations unless 
commuters, shoppers, and school children have a (government-supported) transportation 
network that allows them to travel back and forth. Transportation, housing, schools, 
crime, taxes, jobs—it is hard to think about one of these issues without thinking about the 
others (Frug 2002, p. 1813). 
Coordinating land use and transportation policies on a metropolitan scale is essential for 
guiding metropolitan growth, ameliorating existing job-housing mismatches, and ultimately 
reducing vehicle miles travelled on a metropolitan and national scale. Smart growth policies that 
encourage high-density, mixed-use development in existing job centers both curb job sprawl in 
metropolitan areas and permit the development of more extensive transit networks. A 
metropolitan transportation policy, which prioritizes transit, could, in turn, contain job sprawl 
and revitalize communities in the already developed parts of the metro. Transit-oriented growth 
could boost housing values and tax capacity in central cities and stressed suburbs without 
contributing to further congestion, enhancing the vitality of these communities as employment 
centers. 
For metros to ease job-housing mismatches, every part of a metropolitan area must 
provide a wide array of housing affordable to people with different incomes. This means that all 
communities, not just central cities and stressed inner-ring suburbs, should have their fair share 
of affordable housing. Metro-wide fair share housing is essential for enabling local businesses to 
hire and retain employees who live within reasonable commuting distance of their jobs. It is also 
essential for reversing racial and economic segregation and deconcentrating poverty from the 
urban core of metropolitan areas. Only by implementing metro-wide fair housing policies can 
metropolitan areas overcome exclusionary zoning practices that limit opportunities for low-
income residents and residents of color. In order to enhance opportunities for all residents, 
15 
 
15 
 
metropolitan areas need to redistribute affordable housing regionally, especially promoting 
affordable housing in opportunity-rich areas.  
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